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Abstract The uncertain nature of the demand for university parking has now cre-
ated a major problem for university planners. From a facilities planning perspective,
it is important to comprehend the probabilistic nature of the demand for parking and
parking rules violations. Given this background, in our note, we shed light on two
insufficiently studied issues concerning university parking. First, we focus on short-
term and long-term parkers. We determine the mean parking time of an arriving car
and then we compute the probability distribution function of the number of occupied
parking spots at any particular time. Second, we concentrate on parking rules violators
and we calculate the probability distribution function of the number of violators who
are fined at an inspection.
JEL Classification R410 · D480 · D810
1 Introduction
The problem of insufficient parking facilities is a problem that plagues many urban
areas in North America, Europe, and Asia. In contemporary times, this problem is
also being felt in university campuses. Whether the university is located in the mid-
dle of a big city—as Boston University is in Boston, MA—or in a small town—as
Cornell University is in Ithaca, NY—or in a mid-sized city—as the Rochester Institute
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of Technology is in Rochester, NY—the problem of not being able to find a suitable
parking spot remains. The former President of the University of California, Clark Kerr
once said “I find that the three major administrative problems on a campus are sex for
the students, athletics for the alumni, and parking for the faculty.” Parking is now a big
problem in universities because in addition to faculty, parking is demanded by staff
and, increasingly, by large numbers of students. This tripartite demand for parking
has created not only an acute shortage of parking spots but also a major worry for
university planners who must decide how best to allocate scarce parking spots.1
From a facilities planning perspective, it is clearly not possible a la Joni Mitchell in
the Big Yellow Taxi to pave paradise and put up a parking lot! As noted by Anderson
(1996) with regard to Stanford University in Palo Alto, CA, parking lots in particular
and parking structures in general are very costly to construct and maintain. Nor is it
generally possible or desirable to provide parking spots at no cost.2 The state of affairs
that we have just described in this and in the previous paragraph and, in particular, the
uncertainty surrounding the demand for parking together call for university planners
to comprehend the probabilistic nature of the demand for parking and parking rules
violations.
We now briefly discuss studies that have focused on the problems associated with
parking in universities. Focusing on the Free University of Amsterdam, Verhoef et al.
(1996) have used an empirical survey to study the social feasibility of regulatory park-
ing policies. Brown et al. (2001) have used a survey study of 35 universities to show
that programs like “Unlimited Access”—that provide fare free transit service to stu-
dents—can reduce the demand for parking, increase student access to the campus,
and reduce the cost of attending college. Michael et al. (2005) have used a classroom
game to demonstrate that parking problems on campus can be alleviated by practicing
price discrimination. Sandland (2006) has noted that the use of car share schemes is
likely to be one solution to the acute parking problems faced by the University of East
London at its Docklands campus. Clayton et al. (2006) have studied the usefulness
of active prompting procedures in getting drivers leaving a university parking lot to
increase seat belt use and decrease cell phone use. Finally, Clayton and Myers (2007)
have analyzed the pros and cons of alternate ways of increasing the use of turn signals
by drivers exiting university parking garages.
The papers discussed in the previous paragraph have certainly advanced our under-
standing of aspects of the parking problems encountered in universities. Even so, to
reiterate something that we have already noted, parking problems in universities arise
because the demand for parking exceeds the available supply and because the uncer-
tainty surrounding the demand for parking makes planning difficult. This stochastic
nature of the demand for parking and the inevitable parking rules violations that result
1 We are not suggesting that university planners are the only ones who ought to be worrying about parking-
related problems. In principle, the task of constructing and managing parking facilities can be contracted
out to private firms but this would create some well known “agency problems” for university planners. In
addition, it may be difficult for a private firm to find land close enough to a university campus to make the
private provision of parking facilities economically worthwhile. Because of these sorts of problems, it is
university planners who typically end up worrying about parking problems in universities.
2 Shoup (2005) has provided a painstaking account of why it is in general not a good idea to provide free
parking.
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have received inadequate attention in the extant literature. Therefore, in this note, we
shed light on two insufficiently studied issues concerning university parking. First, we
focus on short-term and long-term parkers. We determine the mean parking time of an
arriving car and then we compute the probability distribution function of the number
of occupied parking spots at any particular time. Second, we concentrate on parking
rules violators and we calculate the probability distribution function of the number of
violators who are fined at an inspection.
In this note, a university planner would like to provide parking to all university
employees who are willing and able to pay for it. We do not distinguish between
academic and non-academic staff in our subsequent analysis because we find no com-
pelling reason to do so. Finally, whether an individual is considered to be a short-term
or a long-term parker depends on the length of his or her parking time. Therefore,
a student, in principle, could be either a short-term or a long-term parker. Similarly,
an employee who works part-time at the university under study may be a short-term
parker unlike an employee such as a Dean who would typically be a long-term parker.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes a stochastic model
of short-term and long-term parking in a university campus and sheds light on the first
of the two issues mentioned above. Section 3 uses a model of parking rules infractions
to discuss the second of the two issues stated above. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes and
offers suggestions for future research on the subject of this note.
2 Short-term and long-term parking
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a representative parking lot in a university campus. Potential parkers on this
lot are either short-term parkers or long-term parkers. As far as parking on this lot is
concerned, one problem faced by a university planner3 concerns how many spots on
this lot to designate as either short-term or long-term. As we have already noted in
Sect. 1, this problem arises in part because our university planner does not definitively
know the demand for either short-term or long-term parking in the lot under study. Put
differently, our university planner is confronted with stochastic demand for short-term
and long-term parking on this lot.
To model this key aspect of the problem, let us suppose that short-term and long-
term parkers arrive at the lot under study in accordance with independent Poisson
processes with rates λS and λL, respectively.4 The parking times of the short-term
3 The entire analysis in this note is conducted from the perspective of a university planner. For this planner,
the arrival processes of the short-term and the long-term parkers are exogenous and so are the distributions
that govern the probabilistic parking times of these two categories of parkers.
4 The focus of this paper is on modeling stochastic phenomena in the context of parking in universities.
As Tijms (2003, p. 1), has noted, the “Poisson process is a natural modelling tool in numerous applied
probability problems. It not only models many real-world phenomena, but the process allows for tractable
mathematical analysis as well.” This is why we are using the Poisson process in this note to study the two
issues discussed in Sect. 1. See Kulkarni (1995, Chap. 5) or Tijms (2003, Chap. 1) for textbook treatments
of the Poisson process.
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and the long-term parkers are independent of each other. Further, for tractability, we
suppose that the parking time of a short-term parker is uniformly distributed on the
interval [aS, bS] and that of a long-term parker is also distributed uniformly but on the
interval [aL, bL].5 Given this description of events, our university planner would like
to know the mean or expected parking time of an arriving car in the lot under study.
2.2 Mean parking time of an arriving car
It is clear that the parking time of an arriving car is a random variable. Let us denote
this random variable by P. We now wish to compute the expected value of P or E[P].
The reader will note that we are working with two independent Poisson processes.
Therefore, to compute E[P], we will need to, in a sense, merge these two independent
Poisson processes. A standard result for such merged processes is given in Theo-
rem 1.1.3 in Tijms (2003, p. 6) and we shall now use this standard result. Using this
result, the expectation we seek is given by
E[P] =
L∑
i=S
λi
λS + λL ×
ai + bi
2
. (1)
Equation (1) tells us that the mean parking time of an arriving car is the weighted sum
of the two short-term and long-term parking time means (ai + bi )/2, i = S, L . The
weights or λi/(λS + λL) are the relative arrival rates of either the short-term or the
long-term parkers. Our next task is to compute the probability distribution function of
the number of occupied parking spots at any particular time.
2.3 The number of occupied parking spots
For definiteness, we shall compute the relevant probability distribution function at any
time t > bL. In other words, we are computing the probability distribution function
of the number of occupied parking spots at any time t that exceeds the upper limit bL
of the interval over which the parking times of the long-term parkers is uniformly dis-
tributed. The problem before us has certain similarities with the well known M/G/∞
model in queuing theory.6 In the M/G/∞ queuing model, the arrivals occur in accor-
dance with a Poisson process, the service times are generally distributed, and there
is an arbitrarily large number of servers. Now, computing the probability distribution
function of the number of occupied parking spots is similar to computing the proba-
bility distribution function of the number of busy servers. The reader will note that in
5 The uniform distribution has been used previously to model parking times. See, for instance, Arnott
(2005). We have modeled the arrivals and the parking times of short-term and long-term parkers as explic-
itly stochastic phenomena. However, there may be a deterministic component to either one or to both these
phenomena.
6 See Kulkarni (1995, pp 387–388) or Tijms (2003, pp 9–15) for textbook accounts of the M/G/∞ queuing
model.
123
A probabilistic analysis of two university parking issues 115
making this comparison, we are thinking of occupied parking spots and busy servers
equivalently.
Equation 1.1.6 in Tijms (2003, p. 9) tells us that the limiting distribution of the
number of busy servers in the M/G/∞ model is Poisson distributed. Using this result
in our problem we reason that the number of occupied parking spots at any particular
time t > bL is also Poisson distributed with mean
(λS + λL)
[ L∑
i=S
λi
λS + λL ×
ai + bi
2
]
. (2)
The reader will note that the expression in the square brackets in Eq. (2) is the expecta-
tion E[P] that we just computed in Eq. (1). Equation (2) and the discussion preceding
it give us the answer to the question we posed at the beginning of this Sect. 2.3.
2.4 Discussion
Our analysis of the two questions we posed and answered in Sects. 2.2 and 2.3 can be
used for planning purposes in two ways. First, note that as stated in the first paragraph
of Sect. 2.1, one problem faced by a university planner concerns how many spots—in
the parking lot under study—ought to be designated as either short-term or long-term.
Now, this university planner will typically be working with existing stipulations for
what precisely constitutes a short-term stay. So, for instance, short-term may mean
1 hour or less. If the mean parking time given by Eq. (1) is much less than 1 hour
then this would suggest that, relative to the existing stipulation, most parkers in the
lot under study are short-term parkers. Hence, it may make sense to designate a larger
number of the spots in the lot under study as short-term spots.
Second, the fact that the number of occupied parking spots is Poisson distributed
with mean given by Eq. (2) can be used to determine whether the capacity of the
parking lot ought to be expanded. To see this more clearly, note the following. Given
the findings in Sect. 2.3 and conditional on the capacity of the parking lot, we can
compute the probability that a car that enters the parking lot under study does not
find a parking spot. When this happens, the car in question can exit the lot and this
will involve a cost. Alternately, this car can simply “cruise around” until a spot opens
up. From the standpoint of the university planner, the marginal benefit of expanding
capacity on the lot would be the reduction in the loss stemming from not having ful-
filled the extant demand for parking. In turn, the marginal cost of expanding capacity
is the opportunity cost of the extra parking spot. Therefore, Eqs. (1) and/or (2) and
the discussion in this paragraph can be used to construct an objective function—such
as an expected net benefit from parking function—that our university planner would
maximize.
In our analysis thus far, we have not said anything explicitly about the “price” of
parking in the university parking lot under study. This does not mean that price is an
irrelevant factor. What it does mean is that this price issue is in the background of
our current analysis. In this regard, note that our analysis has focused on a physical
or non-monetary aspect of the university parking problem. As noted in Sects. 2.2 and
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2.3, once we have an answer to our essentially physical question, we can then go about
the task of determining the price of parking. One way to do this would be to solve
an expected net benefit from parking maximization problem and then set the price
or charge for parking to equal the marginal benefit from parking. A second way to
determine a price for parking would be to set a base fee where the magnitude of this
base fee would correspond to the mean parking time E[P] in Eq. (1). Then, the actual
fee paid by a parking individual would be higher or lower than this base fee depending
on whether this individual’s actual parking time is higher or lower than E[P]. As an
illustration, suppose E[P] equals 60 min in a specific instance. Then, we might set
the base fee at $10. In this case, the actual fee paid by a specific parking individual
would be higher (lower) than $10 depending on whether his or her actual parking
time is higher (lower) than 60 min. This brings us to the second and final task of this
note and this task involves focusing on parking rules violators and then calculating
the probability distribution function of the number of violators who are fined at an
inspection.
3 Parking rules violations
3.1 Preliminaries
Consider the representative parking lot of Sect. 2.1. Our focus now is on individuals
who park their cars in violation of one or more university parking lot rules. There can
be a variety of parking lot rules but, for concreteness, let us consider two parking rules
that exist in the campus of the Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT), in Rochester,
NY. The first rule is that arriving vehicles must typically be registered in the parking
office. The second rule is that whereas one may park in the more desirable reserved
spots by paying a fee and then displaying the apposite reserved decal, individuals who
have not paid the pertinent fee and hence do not possess the reserved decal may not
park their cars in the reserved spots for any length of time.
These two parking rules are routinely broken at RIT but they are broken in an
uncertain or stochastic manner. Now, to prevent the parking of unregistered cars and
to ensure that people who have paid for the right to park in a reserved spot do, in
fact, have a spot available to them, the parking office typically uses student inspectors
to monitor the cars that are parked in the relevant parking lot. Unregistered cars and
improperly parked cars are ticketed (fined) by the inspectors and hence inspections
clearly generate revenue for the university.7 Therefore, a university planner would be
very interested in determining the probability distribution function of the number of
violators who are ticketed at an inspection.
To compute this probability distribution function, it will be necessary to impose
some more structure on the problem. To this end, suppose that potential parking rules
7 We are, of course, assuming that the incentives within the university under study are such that violators
“react” to tickets by paying the stipulated fines. If this were not the case then it would not make any sense to
talk about the generation of revenues for the university. Finally, in this note, we are not interested in analyz-
ing potential fine induced behavioral adjustments by parkers although the modeling framework employed
here can be extended to account for this kind of behavior.
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violators enter the parking lot under study in accordance with a Poisson process with
rate λ . Each potential rules violator parks his or her car in the lot for a time period that
is Erlang (2, µ) distributed.8 The university’s policy is to inspect the parking lot under
study every T time periods where T is fixed. Finally, each newly arrived rules violator
is ticketed. We now proceed to our probabilistic characterization of the number of
violators who are ticketed at an inspection.9
3.2 The probability distribution function
Let X denote the random variable from the previous paragraph that is Erlang (2, µ)
distributed. Now note that even though potential violators arrive at our parking lot in
accordance with a Poisson process with rate λ , the arrival process of violators who
will be ticketed is a non-homogeneous (also called non-stationary) Poisson process
with intensity function λ (t) where λ(t) = λ × Prob{X > T − t} for t ∈ [0, T ]. This
specification of the intensity function and the properties of Erlang distributed random
variables together tell us that Prob{2 > x} = 1 − e−µx − µxe−µx .
Using the last expression in the previous paragraph, we reason that the probability
distribution of the number of potential rules violators who are ticketed at an inspection
is Poisson distributed. Further, the mean of this Poisson distributed random variable
is given by
T∫
t=0
λ(t)dt = λ
T∫
t=0
[1 − e−µ(T −t) − µ(T − t)e−µ(T −t)]dt
=
[
λT − 2λ
µ
]
(1 − e−µT ). (3)
8 The exponential distribution has been used previously—see Andersen and Rudemo (1982)—to model
parking times. The Erlang distribution is a more general distribution than the exponential distribution in
the sense that a k-Erlang distribution is a k-fold convolution of an exponential distribution. That is, it is the
distribution of the sum of k independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) exponential random variables. In
addition, the Erlang distribution is a large or two parameter family of phase-type distributions allowing only
nonnegative values. In our case, k=2. This is because the parking times of rules violators can be thought
of as being made up of two phases. There is a phase in which a rules violator’s parked car is not ticketed
and a phase in which this same rules violator’s parked car is ticketed. Further, each phase is—following the
work of Andersen and Rudemo (1982)—assumed to be exponentially distributed with the same parameter
µ. These are the reasons for using the Erlang (2, µ) distribution to model the parking times of potential
rules violators. See Tijms (2003, pp. 442–443) or Hillier and Lieberman (2005, pp. 798–800) for more on
the Erlang distribution.
9 The parking times of rules violators is assumed to be Erlang (2, µ) distributed. Therefore, the mean
parking time of rules violators is 2/ µ. This mean is not related to the mean computed in Eq (1). In addition,
in this third section of the note, we are not interested in the 2/ µ mean per se. Instead and as explained in
Sect. 3.1, we are interested in computing the probability distribution function of the number of violators
who are ticketed at an inspection. The mean of this last probability distribution function is given below in
Eq. (3). This mean is different from the Eq. (1) mean because the underlying probability distributions are
different. In Sects. 2.1 and 2.2, we worked with the stationary Poisson process and uniform distributions.
In contrast, in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2, we are working with a non-stationary Poisson process and an Erlang
distribution. Finally, we have different answers for the means—Eqs. (1) and (3)—and these means have to
be considered separately because the questions posed in Sects. 2 and 3 are different.
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Equation (3) gives us the expression for the mean number of violators who are
ticketed.
3.3 Discussion
Our analysis thus far in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2 can be used to facilitate planning in three
ways. First, note that T is typically a control variable for our university planner. There-
fore, this planner would like to know the relationship between T and the mean number
of violators who are ticketed because knowing this relationship will allow the planner
to know the nature of the relationship between T and the revenue from the issuance
of parking tickets. Differentiating the right-hand-side (RHS) of Eq. (3) with respect
to T tells us that ∂[{λT − (2λ/µ)}{1 − e−µT }]/∂T = λ{1 + µT e−µT − 3e−µT }.
This derivative is positive when eµT + µT > 3. Therefore, when this last inequality
holds, raising T will increase ticket revenues. However, it is clear from our analysis
thus far that the inequality specified above need not always hold and hence, in general,
there is no necessary monotonic relationship between the university planner’s control
variable T and revenue from the issuance of parking tickets. Put differently, the nature
of this relationship between T and ticket revenues depends on the specifics of a given
situation and a university planner can gain additional insight into the nature of this
relationship by conducting numerical analysis with specific values for the parameter
µ . From footnote 8 we know that (1/ µ) is the mean length of each of the two phases
that make up the total parking time of a rules violator. Therefore, for the purpose of the
numerical analysis that we have just referred to, the selection of reasonable values of
the parameter µ will depend on an examination of extant data on parking enforcement
for the university parking lot under study.
Second, suppose that our university planner would like to maximize the revenue
from the issuance of parking tickets. In this case, this planner could set up and solve a
“revenue from parking tickets” function maximization problem in which the optimal
value of T or the time between successive inspections is determined endogenously.
One way to approach the question of maximizing the revenue from parking tickets
function by selecting T optimally would be to use renewal-reward theoretic methods
of the sort employed in Batabyal and Beladi (2002). Specifically, when a renewal-
reward theoretic framework10 is used, the so called renewal-reward theorem11 can
be used to set up, for instance, the revenue from parking tickets function in which T
is an argument. Then, the optimal T, T *, will be that value of T which maximizes
this renewal-reward theoretic revenue from parking tickets function that we have just
talked about.
Finally, keeping the political fallout from the issuance of excessive parking tickets
in mind, the RHS of Eq. (3) can play the role of a constraint in either a constrained
expected total cost of parking inspections minimization problem or a constrained
expected net benefit from the allocation of parking facilities maximization problem.
10 Renewal-reward processes are a particular kind of stochastic process. See Kulkarni (1995, pp. 452–459)
or Tijms (2003, pp. 33–80) for more on such processes.
11 A succinct statement of the renewal-reward theorem can be found in Tijms (2003, p. 41) .
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Here, the idea would be to choose one or more control variables to ensure that, prob-
abilistically speaking, the number of violators who are ticketed at an inspection is no
larger than some maximal acceptable number.12
4 Conclusions
In this note, we conducted a preliminary investigation of parking issues on university
campuses. Specifically, we analyzed two hitherto unstudied issues that arise from the
excess demand for parking facilities and from the probabilistic nature of this demand.
We first focused on short-term and long-term parkers. We determined the mean parking
time of an arriving car and then we computed the probability distribution function of
the number of occupied parking spots at any particular time. Second, we concentrated
on parking rules violators and we calculated the probability distribution function of
the number of violators who are fined at an inspection.
Our goal in this note was not to conduct an exhaustive analysis of parking issues
in university campuses. Therefore, it is certainly the case that our analysis in this
note can be extended in a number of directions. Here are two specific suggestions
for extending the research described in this note. First, it would be useful to gen-
eralize our analysis by examining scenarios in which parkers arrive at a university
parking lot in accordance not with Poisson processes but with more general renewal
processes. Second, following the discussion in Sects. 2.4 and 3.3, it would be useful
to set up and solve optimization problems in which, inter alia, the optimal value of T is
determined endogenously. Studies of parking policies in universities that incorporate
these features of the problem into the analysis will provide additional insights into a
contemporary problem that has salient economic and social ramifications.
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